• The Design, Testing and Implementation of Virginia's NOx Allowance Auction
I. Introduction
Among economists, at least, the use of tradable emission allowances under an aggregate emission cap is generally considered a mature policy technology. It has become the default policy option in controlling a variety of large scale air emissions, and is being increasingly considered for replacing inefficient source-specific regulation of water pollutants (Tietenberg, 2002) . The same policy technology is also being used in fisheries regulation and elsewhere (National Academy of Sciences, 1999) . In a competitive emissions market with low transaction costs, the initial allocation of rights will not affect the final use of the allowances. However, how the rights are allocated can have significant economic consequences through its effect on entry and exit decisions and on marginal tax rates (Goulder et al., 1999) . The DEQ's main goal for the auction was that it maximize revenue generated for the state. In addition, as a political consideration it was essential that the DEQ avoid negative political consequences from the auction. To this end, DEQ officials indicated that transparency of the auction mechanism was critical.
The law that enabled the auction of the allowances required that all allowances be sold by June 30 th , 2004. The limited timeframe to employ such an auction required a mechanism that could be easily and quickly implemented, and that would execute all sales in a short period of time. The process for procuring a vendor and deploying the auction was likely to take no less than one month, so the DEQ insisted that final recommendations for an auction mechanism be presented by May 31 st ; leaving roughly eight weeks for the design, testing and analysis of alternative auctions.
In general, there are two potential pricing formats available to the auction designer: discriminatory (or "pay-as-bid") and uniform price rules. Auctions that use discriminatory pricing pose an ex-post problem to participants, particularly those who are bidding agents for firms. Specifically, nearly all participants who are included in the final allocation realize that they could have bid less and still obtained the same set of units. Furthermore, since discriminatory pricing encourages strategic bidding below value, there is often a set of bidders who could have made it into the final allocation by submitting a bid that more truthfully revealed their willingness to pay for the good, but failed to do so in their pursuit of extra profits. Thus, discriminatory auctions pose a sort of catch-22 to bidders: a bidder who wins has paid too much; a bidder who loses has bid too little.
Auctions that use a uniform pricing rule avoid this problem: all bidders pay one price, so no winning bidding agent appears to have secured a poorer contract for his principal than any other winning agent. Moreover, uniform pricing rules encourage more revelation of bidders' willingness to pay. However, uniform pricing creates a new problem on behalf of the government seller. The bidding information that is used to determine the price is available to the public, who may be disturbed by what they perceive as excessive surplus left in the bidders' pockets. 1 In the context of the Virginia NOx auction, the DEQ could potentially be second-guessed by the state legislature for not extracting "maximal"
revenue from the buyers. Keeping the bidding information secret could resolve this problem, but because the auction was to be held on behalf of the state government, Virginia's Freedom of Information Act required eventual full disclosure of all bids. 
II. Background Information
NOx emissions from large emitters in Virginia and 18 other states in the eastern U.S. are governed by a cap-and-trade system of pollution allowances. 4 Total NOx emissions are capped at approximately 500,000 tons per year. Allowances are freely tradable throughout the 19-state region. There is an active private market for the trading of NOx 2 These characteristics of the commodities that were to be auctioned are discussed in section II 3 In more inelastic demand environments the clock auctions become relatively less advantageous for revenue generation. 4 For an excellent synopsis of this and related programs see Burtraw et al. (2005 Each state has a NOx emissions budget, and has considerable flexibility in allocating its budgeted emission allowances to sources. In Virginia, allowances specific to their year of issuance are allocated to firms for whom NOx emissions are a byproduct of production. 5 Allowances are issued in one-ton face values, and are "bankable":
allowances issued in year y may be saved for use in year y + 1 or later. However, emitters cannot borrow against future issuances of allowances for use in the current year.
This asymmetric substitutability suggests that firms who needed the right to emit in 2005 would be willing to use allowances for 2004 instead, but the reverse does not hold.
Theoretically, then, the 2004 allowances should command a premium, as the market for such allowances would bear demand for uses in both years.
However, the use of banked allowances is subject to a constraint designed to control the rate of their use in a given year. 6 By law, if the number of allowances carried over region-wide from year to year y 1 + y exceeds 10% of the total regional budget for year (referred to in this paper as the "banking threshold"), then only a fraction of the source's banked allowances may be used to cover the emission of one ton of NOx in year each year. 8 The original intent of the legislature was to dispense the set aside allowances at no charge upon request from new firms. 9 However, because the state was facing budget difficulties (as was common among many states at the time), the legislature decided that these set aside allowances should be auctioned rather than freely granted to new sources.
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III. Auction Design
The conventional wisdom in the design of auctions is that the details matter (Klemperer, 2002) . Moreover, the price discovery process requires that substitute goods be offered simultaneously and that the auction is iterative so that prices move in response to excess demand (Milgrom 2000) . However, as one provides for an open iterative auction, the ability of the bidders to tacitly collude is increased (Klemperer, 1999) . These issues suggest that no matter what designs are selected, it is important to test their properties in controlled settings (Ledyard, 1993; and Smith, 1994) . We begin by defining the goods being auctioned. allowances, and if so, the exchange rate at which they would be willing to do so. This would force bidders to choose between bidding too conservatively or exposing themselves to financial loss. It would also deny the auctioneer flexibility in selecting an allocation to maximize revenue and efficiency.
Allowance Characteristics
Alternative Auction Mechanisms
The auction mechanisms we tested can be categorized into two generic formats: sealed bid without iteration and iterative English clock. The sealed-bid auction for allowances is an extension of the familiar first price auction that also allows bids for alternative vintages (2004 and 2005) to be linked. The iterative English clock is tested with simultaneous linked clocks and also with sequential auctions.
Sealed Bid Auction
The simplest and most transparent of all auction mechanisms is the simple sealed bid first price auction, in which participants submit bids by a given deadline and units are allocated to the high bidders on a pay-as-bid basis. In our tests this sealed bid auction framework was augmented by replacing the standard PQ bids with "Any/Or" (AO) bids. Although this combinatorial sealed bid (CSB) auction relies on discriminatory pricing and thus presents the aforementioned ex post bidding dilemma to bidders, it remained an attractive option for the DEQ. The sealed bid format was familiar to all parties involved, and this auction could be executed quickly and with a minimum of preparation.
Formally, the English clock auction (ECA) is composed of an unspecified number of rounds, r . In each round, the price is posted on an electronic "clock." In response to the clock price, each bidder indicates the quantity for that round that he is willing to purchase. With a total supply of , if , the clock price increases by a predetermined increment, For the purposes of the NOx auction, the ECA had two advantages over the CSB. First, the uniform price rule of the ECA encourages revelation of bidders' willingness to pay, potentially resulting in a more efficient outcome. Second, it solves the ex post predicament of both the bidders and the auctioneer. As a uniform price auction, it ensures that no bidder appears to have paid too high a price, and tends to ensure that those left out of the allocation could not have profitably procured units. As an itera auction, it stops revealing bidders' demand at the market clearing price, generating no information concerning how much more the buyers might have been willing to pay.
Despite these advantages, the case for an ECA mechanism was not clear-cut. Using 14 In our experiments this first switch rule simplified to the previous quantity in either direction because our subjects were allowed to redeem an equal number units of either '04 or '05, but at reduced values for the inferior quality ('04) good.
The third modification requires that at the end of the auction, if the quantities demanded nstraints . Experimental Design e demand parameters used in the experiment, the procedures
Demand Configuration
The de llowances that were to be sold in the to inform their decision.
for at least one vintage are strictly less than the total available, then a revenue maximizing optimization is run (similar to the CSB auction) with the added co that bids from all rounds are considered, and any bids accepted from the previous rounds are purchased at the previous prices.
IV
In this section we describe th for implementing the experiments and the treatment design of the experiments. In addition, for the CSB one ture of interest w the minimum accepted bid. Auction t subjects' bids will be a function of their value and the number of Experiment sessions were conducted using ten to twelve volunteer human subjects selected at random on University graduate and undergraduate communication between subjects was prohibited so as to prevent collusive behavior.
session lasted approximately 2 hours and the average earnings of a subject were $47.30. fea as theory predicts tha competing bidders (Vickrey, 1961) . Nevertheless minimum accepted bids are a common safeguard against collusive activity among bidders. In most auctions we set the minimum accepted bids below the lowest assigned value, so that it was not a binding constraint.
However, we also ran a number of auctions in which the minimum accepted bid was arbitrarily increased to make it a binding constraint. The effects of this high minimum bid in the laboratory would provide guidance to the DEQ as to whether the minimum accepted bid in the auction could be increased to improve revenue performance.
Experimental Procedures
from the George Mas population. Subjects were given oral instructions explaining the bidding and allocation processes of the mechanism under observation. No reference to NOx, emissions, pollution, or any other situation specific element was made in the instructions, to prevent subjects' behavior from being motivated by influences other than their potential payoffs.
All subjects' decisions were made through their private computer terminals, and ood response from our subject pool, however, allowed us to run more than five sessions. nalysis. Table 2 summarizes the number of sessions, subjects, and observations (after w than twelve subjects were available, the number of subjects valuing only 2004 allow was reduced, and each such subject remaining was given an increased number of redemption values for those allowances, so that the total demand in the auction remained the same. No sessions were run with fewer than eleven subjects.
Treatment Design
As noted above, we tested three auction mechanisms with declared reserve prices. The initial treatment design was to conduct five experimental sessions g In a given experimental session, each auction executed yielded one observation on the auction treatment being tested. Because of potential learning effects, observations from the first demand cycle (four auctions) during each session were excluded from the data a trimming the first four auctions per session) for each auction treatment. hus, we collected data for three auction treatments in each of the four environment .
Results
of the experiments was to study revenues generated and allocation efficiency
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable for the revenue model is revenue in a given round normalized by T treatments previously described in Table 1 .
V
The purpose under various auction treatments. Because there are possible session and environment effects we use AR(1) random effects models for the statistical analysis.
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the maximum possible surplus in that round. For the efficiency model the dependent variable is the sum of values satisfied by the final allocation normalized by the sum of values that would be satisfied by the optimal allocation. These variables allowed us to 17 Data used in our analysis and instructions for the experiments can be found at ices3.gmu.edu/VA_NoX 18 Hausman tests were used to ensure that our use of random effects is justifiable. The χ 2 (11) statistics from the tests on the revenue and efficiency models were 17.71 (p = 0.0885) and 14.62 (p = 0.2004) , validating the use of random effects models. determine the percentage of the available surplus claimed by the auctioneer and the percentage of available social surplus realized by the auction.
2.
Independent Variables
The primary independent variables are dummies indicating the auction mechanism used in a given observation (SEC and CEC) . 19 To test the hypothesis that the auctions' revenue generation varied in more complex CE environments, we also include the dummy variable DIFF, which took a value of 1 when the CE prices of the 2004 and 2005 vintages were different and 0 otherwise. DIFF was interacted with the mechanism variables to allow for differences across auction types.
As demand elasticity is an important part of a mechanism's comparative ability to raise revenue, we include a measure of it in the model. We define ValSpread to be: Q is the number of j allowances that would be allocated to all bidders in the competitive equilibrium.
ValSpread is bounded between 0 and ∞ , with 0 indicating perfectly elastic demand and indicating perfectly inelastic demand. ∞ 20 It is included in the regression to measure the impact demand elasticity had on the revenue-generating performance of the CSB and is also interacted with the treatment variables. The inclusion of this variable brings with it the implication that the treatment dummies measure revenue generation in a perfectly elastic demand environment.
We statistically estimate the impact of the high minimum accepted bid rule with the dummy variable HighMin. As a binding constraint on bids the high minimum accepted bid rule sometimes resulted in a suboptimal quantity of units being awarded. The deviation from the optimal quantity allocated is captured in DevUnits.
All experiments were run with twelve subjects with the exception of three of the CEC sessions, in which the show-up rate would support only the eleven subject design.
Because lower numbers of bidders tend to suppress competitive bidding, and because the eleven subject design was only used in the CEC treatment, we included the dummy variable DevSubs, which indicated sessions in which the number of subjects deviated from twelve.
Finally, four treatment-specific variables were included to account for learning effects.
Each session consisted of a number of cycles through four value environments. Thus the variable Cycle was included which simply indicated which cycle in the session an observation took place in. Cycle was also interacted with the three treatment dummies to account for the possibility that learning occurred differently in the various auction mechanisms.
3.
Revenue Results
Result 1: Both English clock designs outperformed the CSB in elastic environments.
Support:
The results of the revenue model are contained in Table 3 . The estimated constant is 0.6540 (p < 0.001), indicating that the CSB would generate 65.4% of the maximum revenue in a perfectly inelastic demand environment. The coefficients on CEC and SEC are both positive and significant (p < 0.001 in each case), and suggest that the two mechanisms would generate 94.5% and 89.7% respectively of the maximum revenue given perfectly inelastic demand. The larger coefficient estimate for CEC demonstrates that the combinatorial design does indeed result in higher revenue.
Result 2: Inelastic demand reduced revenue across all mechanisms, but had a stronger effect on the clock auctions than the CSB. Auctions in which a bid-constraining minimum accepted bid was imposed generated nearly 18% more of the available revenues than auctions in which the minimum accepted bid was non-constraining. However, note the DevUnits coefficient of -0.0134 (p = 0.000). This implies that if the minimum accepted bid is raised beyond the CE price, 1.3% of the available revenue is lost for each unit that is remains unallocated. In our experimental environment 13 units (about 36% of the total available) would have to remain unallocated to fully offset the revenue enhancement of the high minimum accepted bid rule.
Result 5: There was no learning from cycle to cycle.
Neither Cycle nor any of its interactions with the treatment dummies have statistically significant coefficients. We therefore cannot reject the hypothesis that participants' bidding behavior remains constant for all cycles after the first.
These results show that given sufficiently elastic demand, the CEC is the revenue maximizing mechanism, but the CSB raises more revenue in inelastic demand environments. Although a significantly large block of allowances was to be offered in the auction, we suspected that the revealed demand in the DEQ's auction would be quite elastic as participants were unlikely to pay prices significantly higher than those being charged elsewhere in existing over-the-counter markets for NOx allowances.
The experimental results also suggest that there was little if any learning curve in participating in a series of these auctions. Subjects appear to have behaved the same in earlier auctions as they did in later auctions.
Efficiency Results
Result 6: The CEC allocates allowances more efficiently than the CSB or SEC.
Support:
The coefficient on CEC is positive and significant (p < 0.001). The estimated value of the constant is 0.9523 (p < 0.001), indicating that on average subjects in the CSB managed to achieve 95.2% of the available surplus.
The coefficient on CEC is 0.0404 (p < 0.001), demonstrating that subjects in the CEC sessions achieved 99.3% of the surplus. The coefficient on SEC is positive but insignificant. We therefore cannot reject the hypothesis that the SEC allocates resources no better or worse than the CSB. uses. Conversely, SEC*DIFF is estimated at -0.0198 (p = 0.001). Our model therefore predicts that an additional 3.4% of the available social surplus is realized when the CSB is used in complex demand environments versus the SEC.
Result 8: A high minimum bid rule slightly increases efficiency, but is quickly counteracted by unallocated units.
The HighMin coefficient predicts nearly 3.2% in additional social surplus when the high minimum accepted bid rule is in place (p < 0.001). However, DevUnits is estimated at -0.0237 (p < 0.001), indicating that if just two units (5.6% of available units) go unallocated the net effect of the rule is damaging to efficiency. 
V. Implementation Summary and Conclusions
Whatever their strengths and limitations, economic experiments in support of public policy decisions are only one step in the policy design and implementation process. The Virginia NOx allowance auction had to be implemented on an extremely tight time line in order to meet a statutory deadline. This tight timeline had three important effects: first, it forced state administrators to make very quick decisions; second, it forced selection of an easily implemented auction design that would be attractive to potential participants; and third, it limited the opportunities for involvement by outside parties in the decision process.
In late April of 2004, the staff responsible for the auction received reports of experimental results demonstrating a potentially significant revenue advantage of using a combinatorial English clock auction over a combinatorial sealed bid design. The results of this research were not made public. Due to the short time line, those involved assumed that a sealed bid auction would be the only practicable option. A request for proposals (RFP) for brokerage services to implement an auction was published on May 17 for a 10-day period mandated by state procurement rules. Review of bids began on May 27. The RFP had not specified an auction form and most proposals included either a sealed bid design or standard brokerage services or both. Astonishingly, the proposal from Amerex Energy of Houston recommended an English clock auction. 21 The proposal contained assurances that the auction could, in fact, be accomplished within the short remaining time period. This proposal was selected for its potential to achieve higher revenues as indicated by the experimental results. The contract for services was signed on June 8, just 22 days before the final deadline to hold the auction.
The extremely tight deadline for holding the auction drove a number of choices about the final auction design. A web-based auction design was chosen to maximize participation and to minimize the time needed for software development. To prevent bidders from using strategies based on default, all bidders had to demonstrate credit-worthiness with a credit instrument or an escrow account with their maximum possible bid. Every application of an economic design problem in the field has its own unique features even though ex post it may be the case that some of the learning from past experience transfers to the new situation. The advantages of using the laboratory to test-bed a new application are that 1) it enables exploration of the parameter space where there are no empirical guidelines to identify the parameters, e. g., demand elasticity for allowances; 2) 24 See www.emissionstrading.com.
by comparing the revenue and efficiency of alternative auction designs it sets the stage for a more informed decision if compromises have to be made to satisfy time or other constraints on the final choice; 3) by reducing uncertainty and demonstrating feasibility-real people can actually execute the procedures-it enables all parties to feel more comfortable and confident of their ability to achieve a satisfactory outcome; 4) in this instance, it facilitated the final choice of a contractor to run the auction; 5) the cost of achieving these benefits is small-in this case, less than 1% of the resulting revenue from the auction.
